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Abstract:
Social contract theory is incoherent and it does not work as desired. Among the most
obvious disanalogies is that contracts are enforced by a third party, commonly the state.
There is no such external enforcer for a constitution. Contractarian theorists typically ig-
nore all such issues and use the metaphor of contract very loosely to ground a claim that
citizens are morally obligated to defer to government by their consent, as the parties to a
standard legal contract would be legally obligated. David Hume’s term is acquiescence.
He compellingly argues that actual citizens do not believe their own legal or political
obligations depend on their having agreed to their social order. More often than not our
interests are simply better served by acquiescing in the rules of that constitution than by
attempting to change it. The forms of commitment that are important for constitutional
and even for much of conventional social choice are those that derive from the difﬁcul-
ties of collective action to re-coordinate on new rules. They are inherent in the social
structure of the conventions themselves, a structure that often more or less automati-
cally exacts costs from anyone who runs against the conventions without anyone or any
institution having to take action against the rule breaker. Establishing a constitution is
itself a massive act of coordination that, if it is stable for a while, spawns conventions
that depend for their maintenance on their self-generating incentives and expectations
and that block alternatives.
Keywords: Consent, political obligation, contractualism, dual-convention, David Hume,
coordination, acquiescence, Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls.
The most important context for social contract theory is the creation of a gov-
ernment or of a constitution for a government. In this application the theory is
incoherent and it does not work as desired. The metaphorical claim that govern-
ment is established by contract is one of the mainstays of traditional political
theory, although there are several objections to the claim that a constitution is
analogous to an ordinary contract in any useful sense. These objections include
the following.
1) Contracts are typically enforceable by a third party (usually the state);
constitutions are not but are enforced by social conventions.
2) Contracts govern a fairly limited quid pro quo between the parties; it can
be hard even to deﬁne who might be the parties engaged in such an ex-
change when a constitution is drawn up.80 Russell Hardin
3) The exchanges governed by a contract typically get completed and the con-
tract, if fulﬁlled, ceases to govern further; constitutions typically govern
into the distant and unforeseeable future and they have no project for
‘completion’ in sight—as a rule they have no date for future fulﬁllment.
4) Contracts require genuine agreement to make them binding; constitutions
require merely acquiescence to make them work.
5) Game theoretically, contracts govern exchanges, which have the strate-
gic structure of a prisoner’s dilemma; constitutions govern coordination of
a population on a particular form of government and therefore have the
strategic structure of coordination games.
Spell out one of these points a bit further. In a two-person prisoner’s dilemma,
there is an outcome that would be best for one player and worst for the other
player. In a coordination game, the best outcome for each player is also the best
or near best for the other player or players. It is implausible that the major
groups involved in adopting the US or any other credible constitution could face
an outcome that was best for one very important group and worst for another,
as would invariably happen in a prisoner’s dilemma.
The two most important groups in the US in 1787 were arguably the ﬁnancial
and shipping interests of the northeastern cities and the plantation interests of
the southern states. Together, these two groups were a small fraction of the
whole polity but they dominated constitutional politics.
Alexander Hamilton and other ﬁnanciers could not have supposed they would
be best off when Thomas Jefferson and other agrarians were worst off. Any
regime that did not enable them to cooperate in managing the export of south-
ern crops and the import of manufactured goods, especially farm implements,
would have harmed both groups. Any regime that enabled them to cooperate
more efﬁciently in doing these things beneﬁted both groups. The central issue
of the constitution was to eliminate trade barriers between the thirteen states
and to regularize tariffs with other nations as stipulated in the commerce clause
of the US constitution. That was the issue that brought these two groups into
the design and adoption of the constitution as a mutually beneﬁcial arrange-
ment. They faced a relatively straightforward coordination problem. The ﬁrst of
the two recent Egyptian constitutions, in 2012, was clearly viewed as a victory
by the Muslim Brotherhood, because the payoff structure was a zero sum game
with Islamists as victors and secular liberals as losers. That outcome offered no
hope to liberals and guaranteed the failure of the constitution.
Contractarian theorists typically ignore all of these issues and use the meta-
phor of contract very loosely to ground a claim that citizens are morally obli-
gated to defer to government by their consent, as the parties to a standard legal
contract would be legally obligated. Superﬁcially, the social contract seems like
a compelling, good device. Traditional contractarian theorists do acknowledge
one deep problem for their theories. Contractual obligation without actual per-
sonal agreement seems like nonsense, especially given that it is prior agreement
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to ground any claim that future generations agree to an extant contractarian
order.
Moreover, David Hume compellingly dismisses even the claim that there
could ever have been a genuine agreement on political order in any modern
society (1985[1746]). He argues that actual citizens do not believe their own
legal or political obligations depend on their having agreed to their social order
even though many citizens apparently do believe they and all other citizens are
obligated.
Hume’s arguments and facts are so devastating to the idea of the social con-
tract that one must wonder why that idea continues to be in discussion at all.
John Rawls essentially agrees with Hume’s central conclusion. He says that, be-
cause citizens have not genuinely contracted for or agreed to any political obliga-
tion, they cannot have such obligations (Rawls 1999[1971], 97f.). Yet, he still per-
versely classiﬁes his theory as part of the contractarian tradition (1999[1971],
28–30). There seems to be a prevalent view that contractarianism is morally
superior to utilitarianism, and Rawls poses his theory this way. This is a deeply
odd view. A utilitarian acts primarily on behalf of others. Those who enter con-
tracts typically are concerned with their own beneﬁts and need not care about
the beneﬁts to their partners in trade. The former is other-regarding; the latter
is self-seeking. Indeed, this is precisely Rawls’s position: he assumes that we
are all mutually disinterested, by which he means each of us is concerned only
with our own beneﬁts and burdens, not with those of others (1999[1971], 12).
This condition blocks concern with envy. It is a saving grace of contemporary
claims for contractarianism that they are not about contracts. Unfortunately,
they are rather about rationalist agreement on what are the right principles to
follow as though these could merely be deduced from ﬁrst principles.
A huge part of the discussion of contractarian theories addresses how we
are to understand the idea of contractual obligation when there cannot be an
actual contract or agreement by the relevant parties (in this case, the citizens
and perhaps the governors). The nearest thing we ever have to actual contracts
in politics is votes on the adoption or amendment of a constitution. But these
votes typically require only some kind of majority, ranging from simple to super-
majority. Unanimity is an impossible condition for a working constitution or
amendment in a real society, although it is typically required for a legal con-
tract to be binding. Hence, in a sense that is contrary to any plausible vision of
contractarianism, contractarian constitutions must be imposed on a signiﬁcant
fraction of the populace, indeed on the overwhelming majority of citizens. Note
how radically different this is from standard economic contracts. In a large num-
ber contract, if you refuse to sign, you are not bound to it. An effort to establish
a social contract generally must be binding on all.
Traditional, straight contractarianism might be on the wane. Few people
argue for it in principle, although many scholars continue to present contractar-
ian arguments from John Locke (1988[1690]), Thomas Hobbes (1994[1651]), and
others from the distant past. Such contractarianism has simply been rejected,
as by coordination theorists. And in part, it has been displaced by contractualist82 Russell Hardin
argument. Despite the growing ﬂood of work on it, the contractualist program
is not yet well deﬁned.1 Traditional contractarianism is relatively well deﬁned
and therefore its deep ﬂaws are clear. It is a peculiar but false advantage of the
contractualist program that it is ill deﬁned. Its vagueness means that debate
over it will often thrive, even debate over what the program is.
Contractualism is supposed to resolve or sidestep the problem of ﬁtting some
degree of obligation to a regime to which one has not actually consented. Thomas
Scanlon’s original deﬁnition is: “An act is wrong if its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regu-
lation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed,
unforced general agreement.” (Scanlon 1982, 110) A further statement is often
taken as deﬁnitive, although it is peculiar: “On this view what is fundamental
to morality is the desire for reasonable agreement, not the pursuit of mutual ad-
vantage.” (115n) Why is it this desire that is fundamental rather than achieving
moral action or outcomes? I will ignore the concern with this desire because it
trivializes and debases our concern.
Scanlon (1998) himself has primarily been interested in applying the contrac-
tualist idea to individual-level moral theory. The most extensive and articulate
defense of the idea of reasonable agreement in political theory is probably that of
Brian Barry, who says, “I continue to believe in the possibility of putting forward
a universally valid case in favor of liberal egalitarian principles” Barry (1995, 3).
Unfortunately, Scanlon’s criterion of reasonableness is somewhat tortured
and ill-deﬁned. Its use has become unmoored from his original defense of it.
As ﬁrst presented, the term supposedly attested to the claim that moral theory
is analogous to mathematics (Scanlon 1982, 104–105). Mathematicians know
mathematical truths; moral theorists can similarly know moral truths. We do
not know either of these by observation but only through some inner faculty of
reasoning. That the analogy is not apt is suggested by the fact that there is no
terminological analog of ‘reasonableness’ in mathematics. Every mathematician
knows that the square root of 2 is not a rational number (that is, a number
that can be expressed as a fraction in the form of whole integers in both the
numerator and the denominator). No mathematician would say further that
this claim is reasonable. It just is true mathematically. If you say this is false,
mathematicians will say you are a crackpot or an ignoramus, not that you are
unreasonable. One wonders what are the analogs of axioms and theorems in
moral theory.
The claim that morality is analogous to mathematics, right down to basics,
is a perverse variant of intuitionism in ethics.2 Intuitionists believe they can
intuit whether, say, a particular action is right or wrong, and they can say this
without deducing it from any more general principal. Unfortunately, they do not
agree with each other. If disagreement were similarly pervasive in mathematics,
there would not be mathematics departments in great universities.
1 The most important items include Scanlon 1982 and 1998 and Barry 1995.
2 Although Scanlon (1982, 109) defends it against a particular sense of intuitionism.Social Yes; Contract No 83
If all of us reject some principle, presumably no one would disagree with
the conclusion that we should collectively reject applications of that principle in
practice and, furthermore, that it is reasonable for us to do so, whatever ‘reason-
able’ might mean in this vernacular claim. Scanlon’s principle must, however, be
stronger than this. If you think you are reasonable to reject some principle that
the rest of us support, what can we say to you? We might be quasi-Kantian and
suppose that we can deduce the true principle here: and we can therefore say to
you that you are simply wrong. That would surely violate the element of agree-
ment that Scanlon and other contractualists want. They do not suppose that
agreement on certain principles is incumbent on any and every one as a matter
of moral or transcendental logic. They mean for agreement to be genuine, which
is to say they mean that there must be a possibility of disagreement.
Rawls, on the contrary, sometimes seems to intend a quasi Kantian princi-
ple of rationalist agreement. He assumes that any single representative person
behind his veil of ignorance would reach the principles of his system of justice
(1999[1971], 120). It is hard to imagine how that could be true unless those
principles are somehow deﬁnitively correct in the sense that they are rationally
deducible. If this is true, then one who does not agree with the deduction of
Rawls’s rules of justice has evidently failed to understand. There is rationally
no possibility of disagreement. To my knowledge there is no major, serious con-
stitutional theorist who has such a rationalist view of the design of constitutions.
Because Rawls’s purpose eventually is to design the institutions of justice for a
society, one might suppose that he intends for his theory to produce a constitu-
tion. Although he grants that the design of institutions would have to deal with
social constraints, thus making its content contingent, he nevertheless seems to
think that the content of these institutions, and hence of his constitution, must
be fully determinate once his theory and the relevant social contingencies are
taken fully into account.3 If so, he holds a very strange—rationalist—position
in the world of constitutional theory. No working constitutional lawyer could
take that position seriously. General determinacy in constitutional theory is an
implausible goal (see Hardin 2002).
Note that in coordination theory, as discussed below, you could well disagree
with some rule we have adopted, even think it an unreasonable rule, and yet
you could still think it reasonable for yourself to abide by the rule. For example
(a recent and painful example for many Americans), the US constitution estab-
lishes an indirect device for electing presidents. That device made some sense
in the era of the creation of the constitution, but it would be dismissed as a bad
idea if proposed anywhere today. In 1789, transportation and communication
were grievous obstacles and no one had much experience with making democ-
racy work.
The device is to count votes at the state level and then to count peculiarly
weighted scores for the individual states at the level of the Electoral College,
which ﬁnally chooses the president if a majority of its members agrees on a
3 For his views on determinacy, see Hardin 2002, chap. 7.84 Russell Hardin
particular candidate. On three occasions (nearly six percent of all presidential
elections), the Electoral College has elected the candidate who got the second
largest number of citizens’ votes, and the candidate with the highest number of
such votes lost. Most recently, this was the result in the presidential election
of 2000, in which Al Gore had a clear plurality of the national vote but lost the
election to George Bush in the Electoral College—with a large dollop of help
from Bush’s ideologically tainted friends on the Supreme Court. That court, on
a party-line 5 to 4 vote, arrogated to itself the power (not the right) to decide the
election.
Many US citizens as well as many non-citizen observers think that the re-
sult of the election of 2000 was in some moral sense wrong or was a violation
of democracy. But no citizen seems to have thought it right to oppose the result
by taking action that would have made Gore the president or that would have
impeded Bush’s accession to the presidency. Indeed, one can imagine that a
poll would show that Americans overwhelmingly agreed that the constitutional
rule on election of the president should be followed even though they might also
have agreed that the system was perverse and should be changed. It would take
a relatively strained effort to argue that that rule could in some sense meet the
contractualist criterion. But it is easy to show why the rule arose originally
and why it continues to prevail despite the possibility of a constitutional amend-
ment to block what many people think was a travesty of democracy on the two
most recent occasions when the apparent loser in the national election became
president.4
Hence, you might morally or even merely self-interestedly reject a constitu-
tional rule or principle. And you might readily be able to think your rejection
reasonable in any sense that the contractualist would want. But still you would
most likely conclude that it would be unreasonable for anyone in the system to
act against the application of the rule. That rule has the great force of a conven-
tion that can be altered only through the actions of large numbers in concert.
The only defense of it in a speciﬁc application is that it is the rule and that the
rule is a convention that is not readily changeable even though presumably no
one drafting a constitution today would include such a perverse institution as
the Electoral College.5 This defense does not make the rule morally right, it
only enables the rule to govern. In this instance, the argument from convention
4 The ﬁrst election that gave the presidency to the loser of the popular vote in a two-party split was
that of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876. But in that instance, there was a corrupt deal to distort
the process. Such corruption is, of course, a travesty of democracy, but that is not an issue in the
judgment of the American constitutional rules for election of presidents. The availability of the
Electoral College let the deal take the form it did, but one can imagine that the deal would have
been made no matter what the system had been. The second case was the election of Benjamin
Harrison in 1888. In that election, Grover Cleveland received more votes but Harrison neverthe-
less won in the Electoral College. The 1824 election left four candidates without a clear winner in
the Electoral College, and selection passed to the House of Representatives. In 1800 an ambiguity
in the system forced the ﬁnal decision into the House.
5 The College was designed to block pure democracy by using a forum of political elites to make
the ﬁnal choice of who would be president. But presumably, the architects of the College did not
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trumps any argument from simple rightness or agreement unless the argument
from agreement simply takes over the argument from convention.
The chief difﬁculty with the contractualist program for those who are not its
advocates is that there is no deﬁnition of reasonableness and no clear account
of how others can judge reasonableness in general even if we might suppose
that the vernacular term ﬁts some obvious cases (for which we might have no
need of constitutional or moral theory). The term reasonable has unfortunately
been left as a residual notion that is not deﬁned by the contractualists. Scan-
lon’s deﬁnition is vacuously circular. We “desire to be able to justify [our] actions
to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject”. A footnote supposedly
clariﬁes this: “Reasonably, that is, given the desire to ﬁnd principles which oth-
ers similarly motivated could not reasonably reject.” (Scanlon 1982, 116; 116n)
This is one of the least reasonable deﬁnitions in contemporary moral and polit-
ical philosophy. It is unreasonable not least because it is circular The historical
dodges of the fact that supposedly contractarian obligations that were never lit-
erally agreed to were somehow hypothetically or tacitly agreed seem much more
compelling than this murky, circular move to ground normative claims in their
“reasonableness”.
Advocates of the contractualist program seem to think they can spot reason-
ableness when they see it. Hence, what they give us are examples of reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness rather than elaborations of principles for assessing
reasonableness. For example, Barry believes “that it would be widely acknowl-
edged as a sign of an unjust arrangement that those who do badly under it could
reasonably reject it” (Barry 1995, 7). But Rawls’s difference principle might
leave us with a society in which the worst off class do badly relative to many
others. This would be true if great productivity were motivated by substantial
rewards to the most productive members of the society, so that they are very
well off in comparison to the worst off groups. In that case, the worst off might
suffer far worse misery if they did not suffer such inequality. It would be hard to
argue—at least to a Rawlsian—that making the worst off citizens substantially
better off is unjust. If Rawls’s theory of justice is reasonable, then even gross
inequality might be seen as reasonable. We must look at the whole picture of
the society if we are to understand and to judge its justice and reasonableness.
Part of the rationale of the difference principle is causal. There is, at least
possibly, a causal trade-off between efﬁciency of production and equality of re-
wards. Rawls openly supposes that the causal chain is from greater equality
to lesser production, so that some inequality is required if the worst off are not
to be abjectly miserable. If this were not thought to be true, there would be
no reason to have such a complicated theory as Rawls presents, because pure
equality would be a credible theory. At some points, however, Barry very nearly
equates reasonableness and equality.6 Once this move is made, there is little
more needed to establish a theory of distributive justice merely by deﬁnition,
6 For example, Barry (1995, 7) says, “The criterion of reasonable acceptability of principles gives
some substance to the idea of fundamental equality while at the same time ﬂowing from it”.86 Russell Hardin
but it might still be very difﬁcult to design institutions that would achieve ex-
tensive equality.7
Coordination Theories
Before Hume there were three main theories of social order. These are based
on theological views, contractarian agreement or consent, and draconian coer-
cion by the state. Hume dismissively rejects all three. The theological views are
simply false or at least beyond demonstration. Locke and others propose con-
tractarian consent as an alternative justiﬁcation for the state and an alterna-
tive ground for obligation to the state, but as noted above, Hume demolishes the
claim for consent. Hobbes’s argument from draconian force seems empirically
wrong for many very orderly societies, and Hume rejects it almost entirely, al-
though he shares many social scientiﬁc views with Hobbes. Having demolished
all of the then acceptable accounts of obedience to the state, Hume therefore has
to propose a dramatically different, fourth vision.
In essence his theory is a dual-coordination theory. Government derives its
power (not its right) to rule from some speciﬁc coordination establishing a form
of government or a constitution. Once in place, that constitution becomes a con-
vention, that is, an iterated coordination; and the populace acquiesces in that
rule by its own convention. Once empowered by these two conventions, the gov-
ernment has the capacity to do many things, including ancillary things unre-
lated to the purpose of maintaining social order. This dual-convention argument
is compelling for most stable governments in our time. Moreover, for democratic
governments the dual-convention theory virtually demands constitutional limits
on government’s power to interfere in democratic processes.8 The earlier theories
could make as good sense without constitutional provisions and the absolutist
versions of theological and draconian power theories virtually deny any role for
a limiting constitution.
For both of the conventions in the dual-convention theory of government,
acquiescence is the compelling fact. Hume argues, by example, that ten million
British citizens simply acquiesced in the succession of William and Mary to the
English throne, all by act of “the majority of seven hundred” in the English and
Scottish parliaments voting together (Hume 1985[1748], 472–3). Acquiescence
is Hume’s term (469). We acquiesce because it would be very difﬁcult to organize
what would de facto have to be a collective action to topple an ongoing convention
or to organize a new one. While we can readily just happen into a convention,
such as the driving conventions of driving left or right, we cannot so readily
alter one once it is well established. You might detest the convention we have
and you might even discover that most of us detest it. But you may not be able to
7 See Hume 1975[1751], sect. 3, part 2, 193–4.
8 Such limits may fail to stop violations of the government’s principles, as in the US presidential
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mobilize the opposition that would be necessary to change it. The foolishness of
the Electoral College has seemed perverse to many Americans ever since its ﬁrst
anomalous and potentially destabilizing results in 1800 (Larson 2007). Since
then, a couple of elections came close to faltering in that system. And ﬁnally
the ﬂawed election of 2000 was very nearly a destabilizing event that could have
been very harmful if a national crisis had arisen during the period in which
the result could have been in limbo. Yet there has been no substantial effort to
change this bad system for selecting presidents.9
The term convention is ﬁrst used by Hume in a discussion of how property
relations become stabilized (Hume 1978[1739–40], book III part II section II).10
He applies the term very consistently thereafter, but he never speciﬁcally deﬁnes
it. It is clear that the meaning he has in mind is that of David Lewis’s analysis
of convention (1969). Lewis supposes that our numbers are large and that we
are essentially scattered in such a way that we cannot come together to decide
on which of various possible coordination outcomes we should focus. Therefore,
if we ever just do happen to coordinate on doing things in a particular way, that
fact is a signal to us that we could expect to succeed in coordinating on doing
things that way the next time we face the same or even a similar coordination
problem. Since none of us has much if anything to gain from challenging our
prior choice, we simplify life for ourselves by supposing that our prior choice is
a strong signal that every one of us recognizes clearly enough to act on it.
On this account, a constitution does not commit us in the way that a contract
does (this discussion is borrowed from Hardin 2007, 83). It merely raises the
costs of doing things some other way through its creation of a coordination con-
vention that then becomes an obstacle to coordination on some alternative rule
or action.11 More often than not our interests are better served by acquiescing in
the rules of that constitution than by attempting to change it. This is true not be-
cause we will be coerced to abide by those rules if we attempt not to, but because
it will be in our interest simply to acquiesce. The forms of commitment that are
important for constitutional and even for much of conventional social choice are
those that derive from the difﬁculties of collective action to re-coordinate on new
rules. These are not simply problems of internal psychological motivation or
moral commitments and they are not problems of sanctions that will be brought
to bear. They are inherent in the social structure of the conventions themselves,
a structure that often more or less automatically exacts costs from anyone who
runs against the conventions without anyone or any institution having to take
action against the rule breaker.
Establishing a constitution is itself a massive act of coordination that, if it is
stable for a while, creates a convention that depends for its maintenance on its
9 It would be hard to change because the rule seemingly gives power to small states, which together
could block any amendment.
10 See, further, Rawls 2000, 59s–61.
11 The costs of changing constitutions and conventions may outweigh any beneﬁt from the change.
But a great advantage of democratic constitutions is that they reduce the costs of switching lead-
ers.88 Russell Hardin
self-generating incentives and expectations. Given that it is a mystery how con-
tracting could work to motivate us to abide by a constitution to which we or our
forebears have contracted, we should be glad that the problem we face is such
that we have no need of a contract or its troublesome lack of enforcement devices
or commitments across generations. Moreover, the acquiescence that a successful
constitution produces cannot meaningfully be called agreement or consent. Some
citizens might prefer extant constitutional arrangements to any plausible alter-
native, but for those who do not, their obedience to the constitutional order has
more the quality of surrender than of glad acceptance. Indeed, if our constitu-
tion and its institutions are solidly ensconced, surrender or acquiescence gives
us the best we can get, given that almost everyone else is abiding by them—even
if almost all of them are merely acquiescing or surrendering in abiding by them.
Hobbes is commonly invoked as one of the founders of the contractarian tra-
dition in political thought. Ironically, he is even more clearly a founder of the
coordination theory of government. We coordinate on obeying a single leader
or following a constitution. The initial selection of a ruler also is a matter of
coordinating all of us. Hobbes presents an argument from contract but ﬁnally
dismisses it as having no likely historical precedent, a claim later seconded by
Hume. Hobbes says, “There is scarce a commonwealth in the world whose begin-
nings can in conscience be justiﬁed”, because they were generally established by
conquest or usurpation, not by contract or agreement (Hobbes 1994[1651], 492).
He then goes on to defend the powers of a ruler—or, we might prefer to say, a
state or a government—on the grounds that not abiding by the rule of a state
would wreak havoc in our lives. Hence, for our own good, which is to say for our
mutual advantage, we should abide by the laws of our state. This is an argument
that carries even for a government that usurps the powers of an extant govern-
ment. Once the usurper government is well established and is able to maintain
order, it should rationally, self-interestedly then be obeyed. Those whose inter-
ests or views were trampled by bad-faith arguments for installing George W.
Bush in the presidency had little choice but to acquiesce in the government of
Bush.
The difference between Hobbes the contract theorist and Hobbes the power
theorist is the difference between a political philosopher and a social scientist.
His arguments from contract are about an imaginary and maybe even an ideal
or desirable world. That world is a cute story, not a basis for philosophical or
scientiﬁc analysis. His arguments from power and coordination are somewhat
abstract but still they are about the actual worlds that he inhabited and that
we inhabit. Although there are many discussions in his works on politics that
have normative overtones, his most coherent and extensive discussions are ar-
guments from political sociology. As already noted, constitutional content must
be contingent on the conditions of the society that the constitution is to govern
(see further, Dahl 1996). This is in the nature of coordination and convention.
If a particular rule does not coordinate our actions, it cannot become one of the
conventions of our constitutional regime.Social Yes; Contract No 89
Caveats and Clariﬁcations
It should be clear that the ﬁrst issue here is, as in Hobbes, establishing gov-
ernment. It is the strategic structure of that choice or problem that we wish to
understand. This is not the same as understanding the problems that govern-
ment, once established, will resolve (as in Weingast 1997, 248). The latter can
be coordination, exchange (prisoner’s dilemma), collective action (n-prisoner’s
dilemma), and fundamental conﬂict problems, all of which might be handled by
a relatively strong established government, unless, for example, the conﬂicts are
too deep for resolution, as must be true in Egypt today. Contract theories sup-
pose that this problem—establishing a constitution for a form of government—is
one of exchange and bargaining between groups with varied interests. If a con-
stitution is to work in its early years, it must, however, successfully coordinate
its populace on acquiescence to the new government that it establishes.
The nature or content of debates over the design of a constitution may not ﬁt
the strategic structure of the problem of constitutional design. Much that is said
at a constitutional convention is apt to be blather and the fraction of time given
over to blather might far outweigh the time spent on central issues. Successful
or failed coordination on a constitution and government is the core problem.
Some of the easiest resolutions for the new government under the US consti-
tution of 1787–88 were among the hardest of the problems under the weak prior
government of the Articles of Confederation. Coordinating on a central gov-
ernment with even modest powers implied a nearly instant resolution of such
problems as certain common pool resource issues, tariff regulation, commerce
between the states, and military conﬂict between the states. Before the new con-
stitutional order these had been conﬂictual problems, with freeriding, cheating,
and the threat of instability. Pennsylvania and Virginia succeeded in establish-
ing a tariff-free joint trade policy, but other states went their own ways. Having
a central government with sole jurisdiction over these issues turned them into,
roughly, coordination problems, because on collective issues the central govern-
ment must legislate for all one way or the other. No state could impose a tariff on
trade with other states or with foreign countries. The possibility of freeriding on
the resolution of a typical common pool resource issue was virtually eliminated
because under central government the choices were reduced to the binary pair:
provide the resource to all and tax all, or provide it to none and tax none.
The thesis of coordination is a causal thesis, not a deﬁnition of what a con-
stitution is. A constitution can include anything people might want. But if it is
ﬁlled with perversities, it is likely to fail to coordinate us. Even if it looks like
a model constitution (suppose its text is adopted whole from another, long suc-
cessful constitution), it may fail to coordinate us, the people it is to govern. For
example, the people of Rwanda are arguably so deeply divided that no constitu-
tion could soon gain wide support from both Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups (see
Hardin 1999, chapter 7). Most constitutions have failed fairly soon after their
adoption (France may have set the record for failures in the decade or more af-
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coordinate, we would say that it is a failed constitution, not that it was not a
constitution after all. It is wrong to say that a constitution is a coordination
device as though by deﬁnition. But the reverse is true: A successful constitution
must be a successful coordination device.
Suppose that a particular constitution is apparently the result of a bargain.
If that constitution is to work in establishing social order, it must coordinate us
on acquiescence to our new government. This is likely to be a critical problem
in the early years before the government has acquired the power to enforce its
mandate. Hence, what makes the constitution work is that it coordinates us on
social order and is virtually self-enforcing. Hobbes supposes that most regimes
in the world were established by acquisition or conquest, which is to say that
someone usurped the power already in place or some outside body that already
had substantial power in its own right came in and established a regime. Hobbes
recognizes that there is a problem in creating initial power if we want to create a
sovereign by contract. Even though we the citizens might entirely agree that our
government must have requisite power to maintain order and to do various other
things, we cannot turn our power over to a newly ensconced regime. Hobbes
rightly says, “no man can transferre his power in a naturall manner”.12 Hence,
the contractarian foundation crumbles before its state is empowered.
Hobbes’s (1994[1651], chap. 20) account of government by acquisition or con-
quest suggests an important fact about a constitutionally created regime: once
it is in place and working to maintain order it can then be seized by some group
and its powers put to use in continuing an order that is far less beneﬁcial to
many who were well served by the prior regime. For example, the Hungarian
government has recently been seized by the regime of Viktor Orban. This has
been possible simply because social order at that point is the result of general
acquiescence to the regime rather than of genuine approval or support of it. Re-
cently, in Hungary’s distorted election system, 53 percent of votes got 68 percent
of seats in parliament, a super-majority that can amend the constitution at will
and has done so (Scheppele 2014). Acquiescence might be readier once a gov-
ernment gains great power to block opposition, as in this case. To get initial
coordination on a constitution and its regime, however, is likely to require a
fairly broad degree of support. It does not require continuing support to main-
tain a regime that once has power and control of the mechanisms of ofﬁce. The
core issue in constitutionalism is how a government under a constitution is em-
powered (especially initially). Once it is, it can maintain social order and it can
resolve prisoner’s dilemma and other interactions, including other coordination
problems. Trivially, for example, it can establish orderly trafﬁc laws.
Constitutionalism is a two-stage problem. At the ﬁrst stage temporally, we
coordinate on a constitution and its form of government. At the second stage,
that government then enables us to maintain order and to resolve various ordi-
nary problems, many of which are between individuals or small groups of indi-
viduals rather than, like the constitution, at the level of the whole society.
12 Hobbes 1983[1642], 2.5.11, 90; see further, Hardin 1991, 168–71.Social Yes; Contract No 91
Concluding Remarks
To argue convincingly that a particular constitutional system is ‘necessary’ or
‘right’ is very hard, because there is commonly evidence that other possibilities
are attractive, plausibly even superior in principle. The pseudonymous Caesar
(1987[1787]), writing during the debates over the adoption of the US constitu-
tion, put the case clearly: “Ingenious men will give every plausible, and, it may
be, pretty substantial reasons, for the adoption of two plans of Government,
which shall be fundamentally different in their construction, and not less so in
their operation; yet both, if honestly administered, might operate with safety
and advantage.” Caesar’s conclusion is a deﬁning principle in the coordination
theory of constitutionalism. There may be no best constitution, although there
may be many that are comparably good and far more others that would be bad.13
Conventions do not have a normative valence per se. Some are beneﬁcial
and some are harmful. Both beneﬁcial and harmful conventions can be self-
reinforcing even when their only backing is sensibly motivated individual ac-
tions. If we could easily redesign government, law, norms, practices, and so
forth, we might immediately choose to do so in many cases. The very strong
Chinese convention of foot-binding was horrendously harmful, and it was delib-
erately changed (Mackie 1996). The still surviving convention of female genital
mutilation is similarly horrendously brutal, and it is being eradicated in some
parts of Africa. In the light of such harmful norms, we must grant in general
that it is possible to contest whether some pervasive convention costs us more
than it harms us; but successful major constitutional change is rare in any given
society.
We face the fundamental problem that we need government to enable us to
accomplish many things and to protect us from each other, but that giving gov-
ernment the power to do all of this means giving it the power to do many other,
often harmful, things as well. We depend on constitutional cleverness to design
institutions that accomplish the former and block the latter. The cleverest per-
son in this task historically was probably Madison. Americans, however, have
long since lived past the institutions he helped design and the present govern-
ment under his constitution might be unrecognizable to him. These changes
have happened while a few hundred million Americans essentially acquiesced.
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